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Abstract
Software failures in wireless sensor systems are noto-
riously difficult to debug. Resource constraints in wireless
deployments substantially restrict visibility into the root
causes of node-level system and application faults. At the
same time, the high cost of deployment of wireless sensor
systems often far exceeds the cumulative cost of all other
sensor hardware, so that software failures that completely
disable a node are prohibitively expensive to repair in real-
world applications, e.g. by on-site visits to replace or re-
set nodes. We describe NodeMD, a deployment manage-
ment system that successfully implements lightweight run-
time detection, logging, and notification of software faults
on wireless mote-class devices. NodeMD introduces a de-
bug mode that catches a failure before it completely dis-
ables a node and drops into a state that enables further di-
agnosis and correction, thus avoiding on-site redeployment.
We present detailed analyses of NodeMD on real world ap-
plications of wireless sensor systems.
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are often deployed
in distant rugged environments, e.g. Great Duck Island off
the coast of Maine [3], around wildfires in the Bitterroot
National Forest [4], and surrounding an active volcano in
Ecuador [5]. These types of deployment are expensive and
sometimes even risky to deployment personnel. For exam-
ple, in the FireWxNet [4] deployment, a helicopter was used
by fire personnel to deploy nodes on three different moun-
tains, in some cases requiring the firefighters to climb down
the mountain to place the nodes.
Compounding the expense and difficulty of WSN de-
ployments concludes that software bugs are often encoun-
tered in the field. Software can reach buggy states initiated
by data-driven sensing behavior in the wild that is not de-
tected through ordinary lab testing. In addition, rigor in test-
ing sensor networks is much smaller then testing in other
regimes, e.g. space software, due to much more limited re-
sources than are typically devoted to testing. Our own expe-
rience deploying a fire sensor network in the mountainous
terrain of the Bitterroot National Forest in Idaho [4] sug-
gests that software bugs will inevitably be experienced in
the field.
The typical behavior after encountering a run-time soft-
ware fault is for a remote node to enter a bad/unresponsive
state that looks like a “black hole”. The fault is detected
retroactively by what information we don’t receive. The
node is completely disabled and needs to be redeployed.
This is clearly a situation that we wish to minimize, not the
least of which is explaining to a firefighter why they need to
risk redeploying a remote node that has failed.
Our goal in this paper is to offer a diagnostic system,
NodeMD, capable of (1) catching run-time software faults
as they occur and before they completely disable a remote
node, and (2) diagnosing the root cause of the fault, thereby
substantially reducing the need for costly redeployment of
nodes through on-site visits. The WSN research commu-
nity has offered a variety of approaches towards reducing
the cost of redeployment. SOS [9] is capable of propagat-
ing new code images to a remote system. Several systems,
including Marionette [15] and Nucleus [14], are capable of
requesting state information from a running system, and the
recent approach taken by t-kernel [22] prevents some issues
that can potentially disable a node in the field. Although
these systems help alleviate the cost of redeployment, they
still do not provide a complete solution. In particular, the
critical functionality that alerts you to a problem with the
node before the node is disabled, and a history at run-time
about what led to that problem, giving programmers a good
starting point for rapid-response debugging.
As an analogy, current methods of node debugging are
similar to a doctor that needs to visit a very remote area
to treat a patient. When the doctor “hears” that a patient is
not well, he or she travels by wagon and goes to see and
treat the patient. Similarly, just as a doctor’s in-home visit
is expensive, so is the need for redeployment in WSN sys-
tems deployed in remote locations. TheWSN community is
in a situation where in-home visits are almost unnecessary,
because we have a mail-order pharmacy (SOS), telephone
(Marionette, Nucleus), vaccination from the most common
diseases (t-kernel), and postmortem analysis (Nucleus). But
with only these pieces of the puzzle, we cannot completely
avoid a need for in-home visits because we are missing ini-
tial patient contact and timely diagnostic tools. There is no
equivalent ability, in the suite of tools available to the WSN
community, to a human patient that picks up the phone and
reports “Doctor, I am not feeling well, these are the symp-
toms and this is what I did in the last few days”.
NodeMD is the last piece of the puzzle that is necessary
to bring the analogy of a “remote doctor” to the world of
WSNs. With NodeMD providing the missing link, we can
envision a complete system based on keeping the “human in
the loop”, in which problems with the software are brought
immediately to the attention of the programmer, good diag-
nostic tools are provided for timely diagnosis of the prob-
lem, and once the problem is diagnosed and corrected, the
capability to remotely update a sensor node with debugged
code. Ultimately the goal of our system is to bring node de-
bugging from its current archaic state in WSNs and embed-
ded systems to the level that exists in modern desktop com-
puting systems.
The main contributions of this paper comprise the fol-
lowing: building a fault management system for WSNs that
is capable of detecting a broad spectrum of software faults
at run-time; introducing a recovery/debug mode that catches
those faults so as not to completely disable the afflicted
node; timely notification of the fault along with a brief di-
agnostic history of the events that led up to the fault; con-
tinued interaction with the halted node to close the loop
on the debugging cycle by including a human program-
mer; resource-constrained solutions to all of the above; and
proof-of-concept implementation on several real-world sen-
sor applications. The techniques proposed in this paper are
generalizable across many different systems and most of
them are not OS/application specific, but could be used in a
wide context of embedded operating systems.
In Section 2, we discuss related work in fault manage-
ment in WSNs. Section 3 presents the unified system ar-
chitecture of NodeMD. Section 4 introduces our suite of
algorithms for detecting faults at run-time, including stack
overflow, deadlock, livelock, and application-specific faults.
Section 5 discusses our solution for entering the recov-
ery/debug mode upon a detected fault and providing noti-
fication via a compressed history trace of the events leading
up to the fault. Section 6 closes the loop on fault manage-
ment by allowing interactive debugging by a human of the
remote node in the halted mode. Finally, section 7 provides
a detailed analysis of the current implementation in Man-
tis OS [8] for several real-world sensor applications.
2. Related Work
Sensor network debugging today usually begins with
staring at a set of blinking LEDs. JTAG interfaces on sen-
sor boards provide increased visibility into faults, but only
for nodes directly connected to a wired network. For wire-
less sensor nodes in a wireless deployment or testbed en-
vironment, some systems are emerging that provide limited
visibility into fault behavior. The Sympathy system [13] fo-
cuses on debugging networking faults, providing periodic
reporting of various networking metrics to diagnose the rea-
son behind reduced network throughput. The approach is
somewhat limited in its periodic reporting, though the pe-
riod can be adjusted, and does not focus on detecting soft-
ware failures at the node level.
Nucleus [14], a deployment debugging system, was de-
veloped to resolve a lack of information when live deploy-
ments fail. Its primary features are a robust logging sys-
tem and on-demand requests for information from nodes
in the network. One essential aspect we have in common
is our debugging methods must persist even when the ap-
plication fails. Nucleus stores “printf” style messages in a
limited buffer within main memory, and also writes them
to flash memory to act as a sensor node “black box”. Such
messages are inefficient to store in main memory consider-
ing storage size needed vs. amount of information logged,
and the slow storage of messages in flash may affect tim-
ing in the program if log operations are called within timing
sensitive code. Additionally, once a node has failed such in-
formation is only available after the node has been retrieved.
Recent work done in t-kernel [22], a reliable OS kernel,
takes an approach that ensures the scheduler is always able
to retake control from a thread. At a low level, each branch
instruction first jumps to the scheduler for verification be-
fore jumping back to the target address. In fact, this pre-
emption technique would be useful to support some of the
techniques proposed by NodeMD. t-kernel provides a “safe
execution environment”. However, t-kernel does not spec-
ify what algorithms to use for detecting faults nor how to
efficiently provide information to diagnose a fault.
Marionette [15] provides a mechanism to query the
memory in nodes for their state. It is specific to TinyOS,
and does not focus on detection and notification of faults as
they occur.
A variety of approaches for remote code updates in
WSNs have been proposed, and are summarized in [7].
These approaches can be roughly divided into a network-
ing component that achieves reliable code propagation, e.g.
Deluge [10] and Aqueduct [11], and an operating system
component that enables efficient update of code images on
a sensor node, e.g. SOS [9] or the ELF loader [23]. Our
fault management system is agnostic to the particular com-
bination of mechanisms chosen for remote code updates. In
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theory any of them could be reused in the proposed archi-
tecture. For example, the ELF dynamic modules loader [23]
was recently implemented inside of MOS to enable efficient
code updates, the same platform upon which NodeMD is
implemented. Our focus in this paper is not on these mech-
anisms, but instead is on our innovation in fault detection,
notification, and diagnosis, the missing links in fault man-
agement for WSN systems.
3. System Architecture and Design Goals
NodeMD’s fault management system consists of three
main subsystems that correspond to the system shown in
Figure 1. These subsystems are combined under a sin-
gle unified architecture to provide an expansive solution to
node-level fault diagnosis in deployed WSNs.
• The fault detection subsystem is designed for moni-
toring the health of the system and catching software
faults such as stack overflow, livelock, deadlock, and
application-defined faults as they occur, signified by
the ’X’ of the failed node in the figure.
• The fault notification or reporting subsystem is respon-
sible for constant system-oriented logging, in a space
and time-efficient manner, the sequence of events oc-
curring in the system. This compressed event trace in
the form of a circular bit vector is then conveyed in a
notification message back to the human user.
• The fault diagnosis subsystem essentially closes the
loop on the “debugging” cycle, halting the node and
dropping it into a safe debug or error recovery mode
wherein interactive queries can be accepted from a re-
mote human user for more detailed diagnostic infor-
mation, and remote code updates can also be accepted.
Figure 1. System architecture of NodeMD.
NodeMD must accomplish the above diagnostic features
while achieving a variety of other design goals. First, it is
important that fault detection and notification be memory-
efficient and low overhead in terms of CPU and radio band-
width, to fit within the resource-constraints of deployed sen-
sor nodes. This has strong implications, such as the design
to hold the event history in main memory versus external
flash. Second, the design of NodeMD should afford the hu-
man user flexibility to extend and customize the diagnos-
tic capabilities, e.g. in pursuit of a particular bug or class of
bugs. For example, NodeMD allows a user to define their
own application-specific conditions for triggering the de-
tection of a “fault” and the subsequent halting of the node.
NodeMD also allows users to request more detailed diag-
nostic information when a node is in a halted but functional
debug mode. Third, our goal is to introduce algorithms and
solutions that are generally applicable to a wide range of
embedded systems. For example, the stack overflow detec-
tion algorithm is applicable not just on thread-based sys-
tems like MOS, but is also useful to detect aberrant behav-
ior on event-driven single-stack systems like TinyOS.
4. Fault Detection
Detecting faults that can potentially disable a node is
not a fully resolved problem in the context of WSNs. This
section presents work towards identifying fault-prone con-
ditions and implementing detection algorithms to prevent
such conditions from paralyzing the node.
Our system currently identifies three generic classes of
high-risk faults to applications that are of especial inter-
est in concurrent sensor operating systems: stack overflow,
livelock and deadlock, and out-of-bounds memory writes.
Support for detection of both application-specific and OS-
specific faults is also added in our implementation. Our de-
sign can expand to accommodate detection of other faults,
but at present we have focused on effectively detecting these
general classes of faults.
While many WSN operating systems follow event-
driven models, some fault classes between event-driven and
concurrent systems are mutually exclusive. Typical prob-
lems in event-driven programming concern the need for
non-blocking concurrency and run-to-completion code seg-
ments, which are implcitly addressed by multithreaded
scheduling. While our detection system is designed for
the prominent issues in multithreaded systems, detec-
tion of some faults also applies to event-driven models, i.e.
stack overflow.
4.1. Stack Overflow
Due to the extremely limited memory available, e.g. 4
KB of RAM on MICA class sensor motes, we have identi-
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fied stack overflow as a key suspect in software failure. Al-
though stack usage can be estimated by static analysis used
in some approaches [20] [24], data dependency common
in WSNs make it difficult to choose a stack size that is min-
imal yet guaranted never to be exceeded. In addition, errors
in the code could make static analysis invalid. By compari-
son, if static analysis is useful for finding a “ballpark” stack
size, stack overflow detection in NodeMD is a failsafe when
the analysis results needs to be fine tuned.
Our challenge has been to design and build a lightweight
detector that can catch stack overflow before it causes fur-
ther damage. Our approach does not assume any hardware-
based memory protection, such as an MMU, since such
hardware support is frequently absent on the embedded mi-
crocontrollers typical of sensor nodes. Our implementation
makes detection of stack overflow and heap exhaustion rela-
tively inexpensive, so we can afford to call them frequently
without using an excessive number of cycles. We are us-
ing an aspect-based [1] approach for this detection, and be-
lieve that this is a practical approach due to few assump-
tions about the code.
In order to understand what happens during a procedure
call, we present an example of how the AVR-GCC [25]
compiler handles initial entry point to a scope, usually a
procedure. This is the compiler used for MICA-mote class
sensor motes that have the AVR family of microcontrollers.
When a procedure call is compiled using AVR-GCC, the
compiler calculates the total stack requirements of a scope
in the first pass, and then during the second pass it generates
instructions to add this value to the stack pointer at the scope
entry point. There are two conclusions we can draw from
this behavior. First, when a procedure is called, the stack
pointer is instantly set to the maxiumum stack depth of the
procedure, and all stack locations are referenced at reverse
offsets from this pointer. Second, the stack pointer will only
increase at scope entry points. As a result, by checking stack
overflow at these points the detection algorithm is both ex-
haustive and efficient.
Figure 2 shows the stack at the entry point of a proce-
dure with 2 parameters and 3 local variables. Although lo-
cals 1, 2 and 3 are not yet defined, the compiler has deter-
mined that they will be defined within this scope and has re-
served stack space for them. As shown by this example, we
can tell whether a procedure will overflow its stack even be-
fore that stack space is actually used.
NodeMD implements a compile time preprocessor to in-
sert stack checking code at the entry point of every pro-
cedure in the application and supporting operating system
(with a few exceptions, namely the scheduler). Our ap-
proach is inspired by features offered by the AspectC++
language [1] and AOP [27], although we have used a cus-
tom implementation for robustness and to avoid several lim-
itations of AspectC++, including unnecessary overhead and
SP -> 0
<reserved for local 1>
<reserved for local 2>
<reserved for local 3>
return addr
old SP
param 2
param 1
....
Figure 2. Stack content after a procedure call,
AVR-GCC assembly.
language dependence. AspectC++ allows definition of the
aspect that will execute code on a procedure entry and/or
exit. On the backend it translates to standard C++ by nest-
ing each called function within a wrapper function that exe-
cutes entry and exit code. Unfortunately, the AspectC++ im-
plementation roughly doubles the stack overhead due to ad-
ditional variables that are put on the stack during the wrap-
per’s call - these variables are not removed! We were unable
to avoid this behavior without modifying the AspectC++
compiler, so NodeMD implements a parser for C files that
inserts a procedure checking call within the target function
itself.
The stack checking algorithm itself compares the cur-
rent thread’s stack top to the current stack pointer (SP), tak-
ing the algorithm’s 2 byte stack overhead into account. If
the SP exceeds the thread stack top, calling the current func-
tion will result in a stack overflow. Interrupts are addressed
in the same way; at each interrupt handler entry, the stack
requirements are checked against the calling thread’s stack
top.
On the AVR (Mica2/Z) platform a red zone detection ap-
proach is not needed because the SP is only volatile dur-
ing procedure calls, which we exhaustively check. It is
also important to note that using the SIGNAL keyword
to define AVR interrupt handlers avoids stack issues with
nested interrupt processing. Future adaptations will require
compiler-specific algorithms, but an open research issue is
whether an efficient generic approach can be found.
Finally, since it is likely that several bytes of another
thread’s stack have already been corrupted, any further nor-
mal execution risks a memory error. Thus, when this case
is detected, it’s critical to immediately jump to error recov-
ery code, i.e. a debug mode, and freeze the running state of
the system. This is discussed further in section 5.
4.2. Deadlock and Livelock
Deadlock and livelock are cases where a node is still
“alive” but is no longer responsive. Although the node
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hasn’t experienced a fatal error and rebooted (as would be
the case in a stack overflow) one or more application threads
has entered a bad state. In a multithreaded application, it’s
assumed that the loss of even a single application thread will
likely result in a useless node.
4.2.1. Deadlock Classical problems in concurrent pro-
gramming arise from interdependency. When a piece of
code blocks on a condition that will never be met, that part
of the system is deadlocked.
Common cases for deadlocks are a collective depen-
dence on semaphores, mutexes, timer interrupts, and data
dependencies (the thread will unblock when the tempera-
ture has exceeded X degrees). Even something as simple
as a thread that is explicitly suspended and is then for-
gotten to resume will deadlock itself and possibly other
parts of the system. Taking all these possibilities into ac-
count an exhaustive algorithm to determine a fatal co-
dependency would seem to be, if not impossible, quite dif-
ficult to achieve at run-time in resource-constrained nodes.
4.2.2. Livelock Livelocked code, a situation similar
to deadlock, differs because the code is not specifi-
clally blocked but is unable to make forward progress. For
example, a running thread will never pass a while(1); state-
ment and is livelocked. However, since the thread is not
blocked but instead executing compare-and-branch instruc-
tions repeatedly, the thread is not deadlocked. While this
example is extreme, the while condition could just as eas-
ily be waiting for a state in a state machine that will never
enter that state again.
Many of the conditions that cause deadlock can also
result in a livelock by polling on a condition rather than
blocking. In addition the dependency issues noted for dead-
locks, detecting livelock becomes significantly more com-
plex when livelocked code is within an interrupt disabled
context. When an application livelocks within an interrupt
handler or atomic section, the scheduler is no longer able
to context switch, process timers, or have any control over
system execution. Thus, even software solutions used to de-
tect and recover from this condition may not be able to run.
While deadlock can run into this same problem, the con-
text switch initiated by a blocking call should leave the in-
terrupt disabled context anyway.
4.2.3. General Solution: Thread Checkpoints Our key
observation of deadlock and livelock is that they are two
conditions with a common symptom: parts of the system are
not running. Rather than addressing the causes of these con-
ditions, our approach is to identify their symptoms and draw
a diagnostic conclusion based on those symptoms.
• Some threads deadlocked (partial deadlock)
• All threads deadlocked
• At least one thread livelocked
• One thread livelocked in interrupt disabled context
In a multithreaded OS, the symptoms of all but the last
condition can be identified when a persistent thread fails to
repeat a sequence of code. In WSNs, applications are of-
ten duty-cycle driven due to sensing and/or power require-
ments, which leads to repeated segments of code, within a
while() statement for example. When either a deadlock or
livelock occurs in that thread, none of the statements within
that loop will recur. Therefore the case we aim to detect is
when a thread has noticeably stopped repeating.
Use of a hardware watchdog timer is the simplest way
to detect this. If the watchdog is reset at every iteration of
a while statement, the system recovers itself when that re-
set does not occur. Hoever, applying a watchdog to a mul-
tithreaded system presents a challenge: how can a single
timer ensure that several threads are all executing properly?
.
Alternatively, the watchdog may be embedded within a
low-level thread scheduler, but at a worst case it is not fine
grained enough to catch every instance of livelock and dead-
lock. Even at the best case, a scheduler-based watchdog
runs a serious risk of false positives because the scheduler
must make assumptions about the application (how long
can a thread be unresponsive before it’s considered dead-
locked/livelocked?). Yet another extensibility issue exists
due to the logistics of watchdogs. On our target platform,
the AVR (Mica2/Z) platform, the 8-bit hardware timers re-
strict the maximum watchdog length to 2 seconds. After en-
countering these constraints our approach aspires to inte-
grate a viable software solution, while incorporating a hard-
ware watchdog for additional reliabiltiy.
The solution proposed by NodeMD begins with an as-
sumption that in a multithreaded OS we can estimate the
period of the thread, e.g. the time it takes for a while() loop
to iterate. Duty cycles in WSN applications are designed
for relatively specific wakeup/sleep times. Combining the
repetitive nature of threaded applications, and the time con-
straints needed for a correct duty cycle, our assumption is
that we can base a thread “timeout” value on the approxi-
mate thread period. The application programmer effectively
states some constraints about the program, and NodeMD’s
detection schemes determine if those application constraints
have been violated. While this requires some manual inser-
tion of code, it is a best-effort compromise that avoids as-
sumptions about application timing.
Our implementation introduces the notion of a thread
checkpoint to emulate the behavior of a hardware watch-
dog. Each thread registers one or more checkpoints to be
expected, stored in either a hash table or linked list. Dur-
ing registration the programmer specifies the expected RTT
of this checkpoint. Next, a set checkpoint(&mycheckpoint)
call is added to a repeated point in the thread, usually at
the start of a while() statement. When a checkpoint is set, a
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checkpoint parameter is set to the current system real time,
effectively timestamping the most recent thread period. As
seen by the [#] indicators in Figure 3, this approach re-
quires only 3 additional lines per checkpoint. Another point
is that the value of C, the estimated time for the instruc-
tions not shown, can easily be overestimated, resulting only
in a slightly longer detection time. As long as the thread
period is not underestimated the algorithm will work cor-
rectly.
#define sleep_time_a 1000
#define C <approximate cost of ...>
checkpoint_t mycheckpoint; [1]
void thread_a()
{
register_checkpoint(&mycheckpoint,
sleep_time_a + C); [2]
while(1)
{
set_checkpoint(&mycheckpoint); [3]
...
thread_sleep(sleep_time_a);
}
}
Figure 3. Example checkpoint code.
Verifying the timeout of each checkpoint is done at the
kernel level. At a periodic interval (preferrably in a hard-
ware timer), all registered checkpoints are compared to the
current real time (CRT). Specifically, if the difference be-
tween the CRT and the thread’s last timestamp exceeds the
thread’s timeout value, our algorithm assumes the thread
has livelocked or deadlocked and enters error recovery
code. Currently NodeMD enforces a default timeout equal
to 2*period, but the multiplier can be set differently at com-
pile time.
Notice that this solution does not account for the final de-
tection case, in which a thread is livelocked with interrupts
disabled. In this situation control flow is never released from
the running thread. Our hardware timers are crippled, the
scheduler cannot initiate a context switch or process any
software timers, both of which prohibit the detection algo-
rithm from running.
To solve this problem, NodeMD incorporates a hard-
ware watchdog as a second tier in a hierarchical protection
scheme. While checkpoints in software ensure the correct-
ness of each thread, the watchdog is enabled and then re-
set each time the kernel detection algorithm executes. If the
detection algorithm is ever unable to run, such as when an
interrupt disabled livelock occurs, the watchdog acts as a
safety mechanism and enters recovery code once the node
has reset. One of the limiting factors of the AVR watch-
dog is its 2 second maximum timeout, so the detection algo-
rithm needs to have a more frequent period than the watch-
dog limit.
Unfortunately, part of our diagnosis is based on the
preservation of main memory, which is lost when the hard-
ware resets. An area we’re still exploring is whether refer-
ences to main memory can be saved to non-volatile stor-
age and used to access the old data. If the memory on a
platform is not zeroed after a watchdog reset, and we pro-
vide static heap memory for separate recovery components
in the system, it may be possible to save the volatile ar-
eas we’re interested in (as that static memory would always
be at the same place and would not overwrite volatile mem-
ory). Implementation success will likely vary on a platform-
by-platform basis, so this is proposed as a best effort solu-
tion.
Finally, it should be noted that NodeMD’s detection
method is not a time-critical approach. The deadlock or live-
lock has already occurred when it is caught. We do not be-
lieve that this is a big limitation, as the system catches the
fault soon thereafter and is able to drop into a debug mode
that enables continued interaction with the node, i.e. dead-
lock and livelock do not paralyze our NodeMD system.
4.3. Illegal memory access
A recent approach to software memory protection has
used memory maps and permissions to ensure the validity
of memory writes [2]. Validating a memory access in this
implementation was determined to cost 66 cycles, which
translates to a fairly modest cost in memory unintensive ap-
plications, i.e. Surge. Although the memory protection cost
is high when applied to memory intensive applications, we
believe that this approaches is viable because they could be
enabled only for debugging, and then disabled once when
code causing the memory fault is fixed. NodeMD is capable
of supporting detection of illegal memory writes, though we
have currently focused our efforts elsewhere on more unad-
dressed aspects of fault detection.
4.4. Application-specific faults
Many data integrity rules to WSN applications are do-
main specific. An example is temperature in a weather ob-
servation system, which should not report values outside of
a logical range, or report rates of change that are too rapid.
Incorrect data typically indicates a sensor hardware fault.
Our system supports an API that the application pro-
grammer can call when custom code detects that domain-
specific constraints are violated. Our implementation cur-
rently introduces the ASSERT(condition) macro to validate
that certain application constraints are not untrue. This is
similar to the approach introduced by Design by Contract
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[12], but would not kill a program. Instead, since WSN ap-
plications are single process, the application jumps directly
to error recovery code.
Although on the surface this looks like “just plain as-
serts”, there are proposed methods for designing software
in a way that uses assertions to the maximum effect. One
example of such work is Design by Contract [12] men-
tioned above, which uses assertions to verify method pre-
conditions, postconditions and/or invariants.
As an example of assertions in the application specific
domain, a weather observation system could check that gra-
dients in temperature change are within expected limits, and
that the behavior of a particular node is consistent with the
network (e.g. if a single node among 10 nodes in the space
of 1 square mile is detecting a temperature that is 30 degrees
centigrade lower than other sensors, the sensor is probably
broken).
We believe that this custom detection and its interaction
with the system is one of the areas where significant addi-
tional research can be done.
5. Fault Notification
For many complex problems that arise in debugging, hu-
man interaction is often the only reliable way to address
many software issues. Therefore, when a fault is detected
we desire to relay a diagnostic profile of the faulty node to
the application programmer in order to help diagnose the
cause of the fault.
Retrieving fault information poses perhaps the most dif-
ficult challenge to any WSN debugging system. With a
wired interface, JTAG debugger units provide a multitude
of information to any connected node. This solution is prac-
tical for a handful of nodes, but to debug an entire deploy-
ment we need a JTAG unit for each node. At a cost about
three times that of the actual sensor node [21], using a JTAG
adapter for every node in a testbed is simply not practical.
In addition, the use of JTAG units does not expand to purely
wireless environments.
Conventional string logging is a more commonly used
approach for wired devices. While string logging is viable
for some debugging, there are several significant limita-
tions. Each character in a printed string is sent sequentially
over the serial line. At the maximum speed of a serial line,
57600 baud, sending each byte takes 2.8 ms, not including
the overhead in software [17]. In general, sending strings on
the serial line is likely to change timing of the program and
as a result mask or alter timing dependent problems. It’s not
uncommon for an embedded program to run correctly with
several “printf” statements, only to fail when they are taken
out.
Additionally, serial transmission is an interrupt driven
operation not compatible with much of the interrupt dis-
abled code we have in WSN operating systems. Although
polling implementations can be used, this introduces its
own subset of problems. While messages can be buffered
and sent at a later time, the buffer space needed to store
string messages in main memory conflicts with the mem-
ory conservation WSN applications require. Frequent pro-
pogation of messages over a multihop network substantially
increases the cumulative costs in both time and energy con-
sumption.
We present a solution instead that is minimally intrusive
to the running application yet offers a rich set of diagnos-
tic information designed to identify how and why an appli-
cation faulted.
5.1. Maintaining a streamlined diagnostic profile
Once a fault is detected, a key design issue is what infor-
mation to send in the error report. Should only a summary
of the information be presented to the human? If so, which
information should be included in the summary? Another
observation is that a snapshot of the current state of mem-
ory may be insufficient to diagnose certain software faults.
The history or profile of behavior leading up to the fault
may also need to be preserved, e.g. the sequence of func-
tion calls that resulted in the software fault, not just the cur-
rent call stack. This opens up a variety of issues, such as
how much recorded history to store and where (in RAM,
in-chip flash, external flash), how to compress that history
in memory-limited systems, and what historical information
and events will be most useful to which types of faults.
The solution NodeMD implements is to keep an execu-
tion trace of recent system events within a circular bitmap,
similar to work found in ARTS [18] and the Wind River
System Viewer [19]. Each defined event can be described
as a unique order of bits, and compressed to a length depen-
dent on the number of combinations needed to express all
recorded events. Events are encoded in compressed form
and entered into a circular buffer in main memory. When
memory allocated to the buffer is exhausted we begin over-
writing the oldest events first. One important thing to note
is NodeMD avoids using flash memory because the expen-
sive write instructions do not facilitate frequent log mes-
sages.
Which events in the system are recorded depends to
some extent on the application domain. We have identi-
fied a set of 15 significant events that we have found to paint
a fairly accurate picture of execution history. These in-
clude procedure entry/exit, thread behavior (context
switches, blocking, sleeping), timer behavior, and inter-
rupts. Most events are logged at various levels in the operat-
ing system, however our preprocessor discussed in Section
4.1 also adds debugging code to the application when nec-
essary.
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In addition to the system defined events, some applica-
tion specific events can be added to help diagnosis. While
in the system domain it makes sense to log a semaphore
operation, in the application domain it may make sense to
log particular events related to application behavior, e.g. “I
think the fire is starting” in the case of a fire control system.
Due to that, the system should have the ability to log custom
user events. Saving of user events in a circular buffer should
be more configurable than the underlying system level log-
ging.
There is a memory tradeoff between the detail of events
logged and the length of logging that is possible. Long event
traces (e.g. last 5 minutes of running) are useful when try-
ing to determine at what time a fault occurred, but if there
are not enough details in them to know exactly what hap-
pened, they are not useful enough to resolve the fault. Al-
though we do not write in flash memory due to the perfor-
mance impact for deployment mode, debug mode could be
modified to allow for writing the event queue in flash mem-
ory, allowing for much larger buffer sizes at the expense of
execution times.
At the moment, our implementation supports event log-
ging in RAM. Initial experiences with this system suggest
that our design choices provide enough detail and that the
event buffer is large enough to record enough information
about errors. A more detailed analysis of NodeMD’s event
logging and its effectiveness in conjunction with other sys-
tem components is described in section 7.
In addition to what is implemented so far, we predict
that a useful function would be to allow the equivalent of
a request to “preserve the buffer at the moment when this
pattern is encountered, and stop logging once when buffer
space is exhausted”. This would allow us to create snap-
shots of situations in which the error occurs a long time be-
fore the node enters debugging mode (e.g. error manifests
as crash 10 minutes later), and would allow us the maxi-
mum usable data in the event buffer, at the expense of de-
bugging information before and long after the set time.
5.2. Entering a debug mode
Our system is designed to enter a “debug mode” that will
take effect when a fault is detected. Before a node enters a
faulty state, it jumps to a sequence of methods responsible
for stabilizing and preserving the state of the system. This
mode could alternatively be initiated at any other time with
a specific network command. For the the system faults ad-
dressed in this paper, we believe we have solutions to the
previously identified faults that ensure that the notification
is properly sent.
In addition to this, any memory location (including com-
plete memory dump useful for debugging on simulators)
could be sent on user request. However, as the complete
memory picture is expensive to transmit over a wireless net-
work, this information will be sent only at the request of the
human operator.
At the time of the fault, a set of initial error recovery
code freezes critical parts of the system to avoid issues that
might arise from the fault, such as a context switch after a
stack overflow. Certain application modules are then reini-
tialized in software to ensure critical operations such as net-
working needed for notification will be possible even if an
error occurred in that module. For example if the applica-
tion failed inside a call to the radio driver, it’s likely that
the mutex held by that call would not be released until the
driver was essentially “reset”. NodeMD takes a software so-
lution to resetting OS components in order to preserve the
main memory as much as possible.
After the initial code, NodeMD enters a debugging state
with bi-directional communication. A faulty node uses the
wireless network to inform the human that the system is in
a faulty state and upload the available crash information.
Given that the event trace is large enough to span several
packets, the initial content of this information is limited to
the direct cause of error and the event trace itself. Follow-
ing the first upload, the node will remain in a duty-cycled
standby state waiting for instructions. While NodeMD has
a limited implementation of this debugging mode, open re-
search issues include whether jumping to this mode could
cause parts of the system at the time of the fault to be lost,
and whether certain faulty states could interfere with the
correct operation of the debugging code. Additionally, there
is a great deal of post-analysis research still to be done re-
garding reliable network communication between the pro-
grammer and the debugging mode.
6. Fault Diagnosis - Closing the Loop
The final piece of the architecture is closing the loop
to enable interaction between the human user and faulty
nodes in the system. Our system permits two forms of data
to be sent to the faulty node, namely queries for more de-
tailed information and updates containing new code. For
example, our system is open to retrieving an entire mem-
ory dump from a faulty sensor node along with any logged
diagnostic information. In terms of remote code updates,
our intent is to choose a reasonable combination of reliable
code propagation and degree of operating system modular-
ity to enable dynamic reprogramming. The prior work in
this area [9, 10, 11] offers many options for closing the loop
in fault management systems for WSNs. .
At this point the node is effectively in a remote debug-
ging state and the human is able to perform several actions.
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6.1. Remote Debugging
By tweaking the monitoring parameters more informa-
tion about the fault can be collected (e.g. increasing the
size of the event bitmap, and amount of info collected). The
node can be restarted to replicate the error and take the new
parameters into effect. If more information is still needed,
an entire memory dump can be transferred from the sen-
sor node to the human. However, this is an expensive opera-
tion because a Mica2/Z node has total of 4 KB of RAM [6],
and packet sizes are typically fewer than 50 bytes. This be-
comes significantly slower and more costly if a faulty node
is multiple hops away from the base station.
Our controls allow the human to obtain all available fault
information on a node, and at the same time avoids unnec-
essarily straining power consumption of the node and net-
work (as would be a case if an entire memory dump were
initiated). At the same time, it allows on-demand transfer
of all information to the human, allowing the human to bal-
ance how usable the information is versus how much strain
its transfer puts on system resources.
6.2. Code Updates
The Mantis research group is currently working on an
implementation that modifies MOS to support dynamic
loading of modules as a means of efficient code updates.
The MOS system has been supplemented with a thread
whose task is to act as an ELF loader [23]. This work is an
ongoing collaboration with the Swedish Institute of Com-
puter Science (SICS). Once this is completed, our imple-
mentation of NodeMD in MOS will be able to leverage this
mechanism for integrating a method for remote code up-
dates.
7. Implementation and Experimental Analy-
sis
To evaluate the effectiveness of NodeMD, we present
our implementation results from the use of NodeMD in
the Mantis OS (MOS). All of our experimental results are
based on this MOS implementation; however the system is
not inherently tied to any OS. Notification and diagnostic
schemes proposed in this paper could be implemented in
any operating system, and although fault detection schemes
proposed are tailored towards multithreaded OS’s, some of
the general techniques are applicable to event driven mod-
els as well.
7.1. Detection of Discussed Faults
With respect to the detection of deadlock, livelock, stack
overflow and application-specific faults, the implementation
of NodeMD is able to successfully detect the target condi-
tions presented in earlier sections.
In our experiments we are able to implement several
cases of stack overflow, all of which are immediately de-
tected with an accurate event history leading to that stack
overflow. In an ironic twist, while testing the system for
deadlock recovery a bug in the recovery code caused a stack
overflow. Although the recovery code was not expected to
analyze itself and this scenario was unintentionally encoun-
tered, NodeMD’s stack overflow detection correctly identi-
fied the problem.
The exhaustive approach in our stack overflow detection
should always detect cases of stack overflow without the
risk of false positives. That said, part of our detection does
take the 2 byte calling overhead for the detection function
into account, and therefore will detect the overflow 2 bytes
early.
Section 4.2.3 identifies four specific cases all classi-
fied under the general terms deadlock and livelock: com-
plete deadlock, partial deadlock, livelock, and interrupt-
disabled livelock. For each of these conditions we evaluated
NodeMD’s checkpoint-based algorithm on a binary scale:
either the deadlock/livelock occurance was caught, or it was
not. Our tests use a simple application to reproduce condi-
tions leading to these cases.
The test application starts a set of threads programmed
to either run correctly, or encounter one of the problems
above. The checkpoint-based approach was able to accu-
rately detect the presence of all cases with 1, 2 and more
than 2 threads in combinations of complete deadlock, par-
tial deadlock and livelock.
As for the false positives, due to how algorithm works, if
correct thread periods are specified, the algorithm will not
incorrectly report a deadlock or livelock. However, the re-
sponsibility for estimating this value is left entirely to the
application programmer.
Keeping in mind that this algorithm is an extension of
the standard watchdog timer approach to detection of dead-
lock/livelock (by allowing the equivalent of multiple watch-
dog timers with only one hardware timer), it is not supris-
ing that it has characteristics similar to watchdog timers.
Namely, avoidance of false positives, and capturing the oc-
curance of deadlock or livelock within a time bound equal
to the sum of the failed thread’s period and the periodic in-
terval of the checking algorithm.
Our current implementation was able to detect that
interrupt-disabled livelock case occured. This is proba-
bly the least common deadlock state, as systems are spend-
ing majority of their time with the interrupts enabled. At
the moment, implementation is limited to entering de-
bug mode, so signaling of this situation is possible but
previous state of the memory is not preserved.
Correctly diagnosing an individual case of dead-
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lock/livelock has actually occurred has also proven to
be dependent on the event trace. Checkpoint-based de-
tection algorithm is solution providing information to
the human, it expects an programmer to correctly inter-
pret the data in order to diagnose the problem. Experi-
ence from the hard-real time community that is using
similar tools [19], [26] indicates that similar systems pro-
vide significant help in understanding system behavior, and
that if anything there is not as much question of is this use-
full approach as would logging of additional event cate-
gories be usefull.
It is very difficult to design an experiment that measures
effectiveness in a general case, but the fact that the combi-
nation of hardware watchdogs and event traces have been
used for a long time in the hard real time community [19]
attests to their usefulness in practice. In addition, NodeMD
provides more information than the programmer had ear-
lier, including how deadlock detection location corresponds
to the code.
7.2. Event Logging - Detailed Analysis
Using the compressed trace described in section 5.1, our
implementation of NodeMD uses 4 bits for each logged
event in the system. Using binary bit patterns we have 24ˆ
(16) possible events. Application behavior is modeled by
the following set of events:
• Context switches
• Procedure calls/returns
• Hardware interrupts
• Thread blocks/unblocks, both explicit and OS directed,
i.e. interrupt driven devices
• Software timer sets/fires
• Thread sleep/wakeup behavior
• Creating and exiting threads
In Figure 4 we can see how the C code in a simple mos
application corresponds to an event trace received when
a fault occurs. In the code we see two threads, start and
blink a, respectively identified by blue and green color cod-
ing. The trace below has also been color coded to represent
the high level picture of system behavior, and line numbers
have been added to traces where we can approximate the
application-level cursor. We can clearly identify different
running thread contexts, context switchs, and kernel rou-
tines for thread scheduling and power management. Note
that in this example the ASSERT(0) statement simulates the
failure of an application-specific fault. We will describe a
more complex example in detail further in this section.
At line 8 the application code sets a BREAKPOINT trace
code in order to help identify key locations in the applica-
tion code. “Breakpoint” can be inserted anywhere in code as
Figure 4. Example application and cor-
rosponding trace data.
a “find me” for the programmer, which helps to provide cor-
respondence between code and event traces. In Figure 4 we
see this breakpoint appear as the last trace before the error,
so since we know where the breakpoint was inserted (which
in other cases will likely be compounded with any follow-
ing events) we can conclude where the error occurred.
One issue we’ve encountered is the ambiguity when
changing contexts with several threads, as opposed to this
case which has only two threads. When a context switch
occurs, it’s often very difficult to tell which thread is cur-
rently running in the trace, especially when those threads
have very similar behavior. Part of the optimization needed
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by our run-time logging is a tradeoff between the amount
of history to record and the detail of each record. The re-
quirements will vary widely on an application-specific ba-
sis, so we allow the application to configure such parame-
ters as buffer size and bits per trace code. A flag at com-
pile time could allow the scheduler to set a trace at each
context switch indicating which thread is now running. Al-
ternatively, application programmers can increase the trace
code size to explicitly create their own trace codes on top of
the default 16.
During our implementation we uncovered an event trace
of an actual legacy bug in MOS, previously only detected
by unpredictable behavior and code analysis. Recently, sev-
eral MOS programmers had identified a bug where cer-
tain thread behavior would unknowningly initiate a context
switch while within an interrupt handler. Specifically, when
an interrupt handler posted a semaphore that unblocked a
thread, the kernel would initiate a thread dispatch to imme-
diately process the unblocked thread (if that thread was at
the front of the ready queue). In most cases, this would not
pose a problem because a blocking operation in the other
thread would immediately context switch back to the han-
dler, which would then exit. However, under certain con-
ditions, MOS programmers reported a visible 1 second de-
lay would occur between the entry and return from an inter-
rupt handler. While that specific example is not available,
we identifed the occurance of this phenomena while testing
this system. The before-and-after traces from the bugged
code and then the corrected code are shown in Figure 5.
Notice the highlighted traces in the first trace section.
Areas in red are execution within the interrupt handler, ar-
eas in yellow are outside of the handler. When a timer
fires [48], it’s handler procedure is called [49] and the
semaphore is posted [50] (unblocking a thread waiting for
that semaphore). Immediately we recognize the system con-
text switch out of the handler [51] before the trace reports
a procedure return. This indicates our handler has not re-
turned which results in several unpredicted conditions, one
of which is the new running thread remains in the interrupt
disabled context initiated by the handler. Fortunately within
a few instructions the other thread goes to sleep [53] and
context returns to the handler [54], which then returns [55].
Clearly there could have been a serious context error if the
external thread did not block immediately.
In the second trace section, the same set of code is run
with the OS bug fixed. Since the section highlighted in red
is the entire interrupt handler routine without interruptions,
we have verified that the bug has been fixed.
Finally, while the shown traces are true to the actual ex-
ecution in most cases, the events in this model are imple-
mented within MOS on a best-effort basis. One thing we do
not include are scheduler interrupts (occuring every 1 ms
in MOS), and instead record behavior occasionally result-
Figure 5. Before-and-after traces from a bug
in MOS, where an application could un-
knowningly context switch out of an interrupt
handler.
ing from that interrupt, such as context switching or soft-
ware timer processing. Recording a trace every 1 ms may
be realistic, but by overwriting useful data in the buffer that
rapidly it defies the practical use of this system. If an er-
ror were to occur directly related to that interrupt, we would
be unable to visualize that error in the trace.
7.3. Event Trace Evaluation
One of the most difficult questions posed by our sys-
tem is the optimal event trace size. How can we most ef-
ficiently use our limited memory to log only useful data?
In some cases simply covering all events within the period
of each thread is acceptable, in others more extensive in-
formation is necessary. In general, the factors that influence
our buffer “burn rate” are entirely application specific: the
number of threads and software timers, the number of func-
tion calls within that concurrent code, and even the types
of functions called determine the required size for a certain
time window.
Table 1 identifies the number of traces logged in MOS
routines commonly called by sensor applications.
As a case study, let’s describe the sensor networking ap-
plication used in the FireWxNet deployment. This is a very
complex application encompassing nearly all of the features
in MOS. Within the application, two threads are spawned.
In the first, every 1 second data is read from 4 different sen-
sors into a packet buffer and sent over the radio. The other
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Routine Traces Required
mos led blink 2
printf 13 + n chars
dev read 18
com send (CC2420) 23
com recv 31
com recv timed 32 (success)
com recv timed 12 (timed out)
Table 1. Trace requirements for common
application-called routines in MOS.
thread repeats a blocking receive on a 5 second timeout.
During the execution of these threads, a wind sensor hard-
ware interrupt fires periodically, and three software timers
retrieve data from the wind sensor, updates the neighbor ta-
ble, and handles state transitions for power management.
After 1 minute awake time, the node changes to a low power
sleep state for the following 14 minutes.
In our experiments, processing a single iteration of
the sending and receiving threads, plus all concurrent
timers, requires approximately 250 traces. Even one iter-
ation of just the sending thread, without timers, requires
98 traces, resulting from several dev read() calls fol-
lowed by a com send(). Given that the scheduled awake
time for this duty cycle leads to at least 60 iterations of
the sending thread, logging the entire awake period is out-
rageously expensive - around 6000 traces, or 3000 bytes
using our approach.
However, many conclusions can be drawn from only the
most recent events. A stack overflow trace showing a se-
ries of function calls without returns may be due to an un-
intentional recursion. On the other hand, a stack overflow
showing relatively normal behavior indicates that the allo-
cated stack size was probably too small, and certain condi-
tions lead to a slightly higher requirement than expected.
Alternative methods for determining buffer sizes
presents an interesting topic for future work in this area.
A static analyzer could be incorporated into the sys-
tem for optimal buffer size allocation. Using a database
of trace sizes expanded from the limited example in Fig-
ure ?? and a set of basic requirements for application pro-
grams, a rough estimate for buffer space used per time
could be determined. Additionally, allowing for selec-
tive logging of only particular events and for “freezing”
the buffer content after particular patterns of events has oc-
curred (as suggested in section 5.1.) would allow for the
available buffer space to be utilized only for the time pe-
riod with the most useful debugging information.
7.4. General Overhead
How do our algorithms actually impact system perfor-
mance? One of NodeMD’s primary objectives was to re-
main lightweight and unintrusive as possible to the under-
lying application and OS. Evaluating the simplest blink led
application against the FireWxNet application from our
case study, the requirements of NodeMD are quite reason-
able. For reference, the blink led application uses a single
thread to frequently toggle an LED (the FireWxNet code is
described in the above section). Table 7.4 shows a compari-
son between the original data in MOS followed by the com-
pounded overhead with NodeMD included.
Application Original MOS NodeMD Included
blink led RAM 585 887
blink led ROM 25212 28768
FireWxNet RAM 780 1072
FireWxNet ROM 30204 34470
Table 2. Overhead analysis in MOS, see text
for details.
Using these results we see an increase in main mem-
ory requirements corresponding to 92 bytes + trace buffer
size + 10 bytes per checkpoint). These experiments assume
1 checkpoint per application thread, which translates to an
extra 10 bytes in the blink led application and 20 bytes
in the FireWxNet application. The 92 bytes of static over-
head is accrued from necessary globals in the implementa-
tion, including a 67 byte packet buffer. We also see an ad-
ditional 1˜4% increase in program memory, a result of the
preprocessor-added debugging code, the added amount be-
ing dependent on the complexity of the application. Given
the features added by NodeMD, and the flexiblity to tai-
lor several trace buffer details to minimize or expand over-
head, the requirement costs of NodeMD are far outweighed
by its contributions.
One of the important qualities of the logging system is
that it does not impact program timing in substantial way.
In effect, each log operation takes either 43 or 79 cycles, de-
pending on whether the log crosses a byte boundary or not.
Although it is possible that this would be enough to change
timing of the program, this is a fairly small number. Calling
mos led on() costs 35 cycles, so writing a trace is equiva-
lent to turning on between one and two LEDs, which is es-
sentially invisible to the application.
The algorithm itself is a straightforward sequence of in-
structions and is unlikely to dramatically change the order
of execution, as opposed to a printf statement that initiates
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several blocking operations, context switches, and hardware
interrupts.
Likewise, the detection of stack overflow uses only 32
cycles to check at each function call, which is even less
likely to noticeably impact timing.
Although exhaustively checking procedure entry points
and frequently calling traces can become expensive, gen-
erally WSN applications are considered to have a relative
abundance of CPU cycles [22]. The FireWxNet applica-
tion spends the majority of its awake cycle idling, wait-
ing for timers, data available on the radio, data available
on the ADC, and other system events. Therefore the addi-
tional cycles added by NodeMD should not introduce sub-
stantial timing delays due to CPU processing latency.
8. Future Work
We have identified several key areas for future work as
we have presented the paper. In addition, NodeMD needs
more in situ testing, in order to prove its capabilities in de-
ployed environments. We plan to instrument a WSN field
application in the coming months with NodeMD. We would
like to be able to assess the accuracy of such a NodeMD
deployment in capturing bugs that occur in the field. We
would also like to demonstrate the generalizability of the
proposed detection algorithms and notification architecture
of NodeMD to other embedded OS’s such as micro-C OS.
9. Conclusions
This paper has described NodeMD, a comprehensive
system implementation for detection, notification, and di-
agnosis of sofware failures in remote wireless sensor nodes,
thereby minimizing the need for on-site redeployment of
failed nodes. NodeMD is capable of detecting a broad spec-
trum of software faults as they occur and before the com-
pletely disable a node, including stack overflow, deadlock,
livelock, and application-specific faults. We present specific
novel detection algorithms: aspect-based stack overflow de-
tection; and application-defined thread checkpoints that act
as custom watchdog timers within each thread. We intro-
duce a debug mode that halts the embedded system upon
detection of a failure, and notifies a remote user via a sum-
marized event trace in the form of a bit vector. Our system
closes the loop by permitting interactive queries from the
remote human user for more diagnostic state. We present
detailed implementations and experimental analysis of all
of our fault detection algorithms on real-world applications
such as the FireWxNet. We observe that NodeMD has al-
ready captured two real-world bugs in the Mantis OS.
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